





What do we disagree about when we disagree about logic? On the face of it,
classical and nonclassical logicians disagree about the laws of logic and the
nature of logical properties. Yet, sometimes the parties are accused of talking
past each other. The worry is that if the parties to the dispute do not mean
the same thing with ‘if’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, they fail to have genuine disagreement
about the laws in question. After the work of Quine, this objection against
genuine disagreement about logic has been called the meaning-variance thesis.
We argue that the meaning-variance thesis can be endorsed without blocking
genuine disagreement. In fact, even the type of revisionism and nonapriorism
championed by Quine turns out to be compatible with meaning-variance.
1 The meaning-variance thesis
Suppose that two logicians, Astrid and Beatrice, are arguing about a logical
law. Astrid says that the law is valid, Beatrice that it is invalid. Both of them
have reasons for their beliefs. They believe what they believe because they
subscribe to different theories about logical properties such as validity, truth,
and provability. At least on the face of it Astrid and Beatrice are capable of
having a rational debate about their beliefs. They offer arguments, objections,
and replies. Although they ultimately stick to their respective positions, they
feel the pull of each other’s arguments. Every now and then Astrid relies on
the very law in dispute when arguing for her position. Beatrice rejects these
arguments. Nonetheless, they don’t give up on finding ways of convincing the
other person that they in fact have the superior position. Despite the apparent
stalemate, Astrid and Beatrice both think the debate is worthwhile.
The situation, I believe, is familiar in the philosophy of logic. Classical and
nonclassical logicians disagree about logical laws, and they offer reasons for their
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positions. Sometimes the arguments rely on contentious principles, but not
always. The participants, myself included, believe that the debate is important
and productive. Nonetheless there is a well-known claim to the effect that there
is no genuine disagreement in cases such as that of Astrid and Beatrice. Instead
they are involved in a mere verbal dispute. Classical and nonclassical logicians
are not engaged in a substantive debate about the nature of logical laws, but are
simply attaching different meanings to the same expressions. Once the parties
are clear on what they mean by locutions such as ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘valid’, ‘proof’,
the conversation can proceed with the dispute resolved.
This claim has been called the meaning-variance thesis, and it is attributed
to Quine (1960a; 1986).1 In a pivotal section, entitled ‘Change of logic, change
of subject’, Quine considers a ‘popular extravaganza’, a discussion between a
logician who rejects the law of non-contradiction and a counterpart who warns
against the consequences:
My view of the dialogue is that neither party knows what he is talking
about. They think that they are talking about negation, ‘„’, ‘not’;
but surely the notion ceased to be recognisable as negation when
they took to regarding some conjunctions of the form ’p.„p’ as true,
and stopped regarding such sentences as implying all others. Here,
evidently, is the deviant logician’s predicament: when he tries to
deny the doctrine he only changes the subject. (Quine 1986, 81)
Elsewhere Quine puts the point in a different way:
[T]he departure from the law of the excluded middle would count
as evidence of revised usage of ‘or’ and ‘not’. ... For the deviating
logician the words ‘or’ and ‘not’ are unfamiliar, or defamiliarized.
(Quine 1960a, 362)
So when the nonclassical logician rejects a central classical law, say, for negation,
the use of the expression has been revised. ‘[A]lternative logics are inseparable
practically from mere change in usage of logical words.’ (ibid., 355)
In one sense it is trivial that rejecting a classical logical law will lead the
nonclassical logician to revise the use of an expression. If one rejects the law of
excluded middle, then the use of disjunction should reflect that. But Quine’s
claim appears to be stronger. He says that neither party knows what they are
talking about. The nonclassical logician ‘only changes the subject’. Nonclassical
logic cannot be separated from ‘mere change in usage’.
Quine (1986, 81) gives an example to motivate the thesis. He asks us to
consider a deviant logician who has simply swapped around the logical laws of
conjunction and disjunction. In that case, he suggests, it would be ‘nonsense’
to think that the deviant logician really disagreed with us ‘on points of logical
doctrine’. He continues:
1As far as I know the name is due to Haack (1978, 224).
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There is no residual essence of conjunction and alternation in addition
to the sounds and notations and the laws in conformity with which
a man uses those sounds and notations. (ibid.)
Although Quine doesn’t talk about change of meaning explicitly, others have
interpreted him as saying that a change of logical laws involves a change of
meaning. The thinking is that the laws that govern a logical expression—or
at least some of them—also fix the meaning of the expression. Thus, if a
nonclassical logician rejects modus ponens for the conditional, the resulting
nonclassical conditional differs in meaning from the conditional of classical logic.
Haack (1974, 8) explicitly attributes an argument of this form to Quine.
Before quoting Quine as an example, she points out that some authors have
claimed that classical and nonclassical logics are not genuine rivals, ‘because
their apparent incompatibility with classical logic is explicable as resulting from
change of meaning of the logical constants’. Dummett (1978a) also construes
Quine’s argument as an argument about meaning:
[Quine] begins by remarking that it is impossible for anyone to deny
a law of classical logic: for, if he fails to accept some formula which
a classical logician would take to be a formulation of such a law, this
failure would establish a conclusive ground for saying that he was
not attaching to the logical constants appearing in the formula the
same meanings as those attached by the classical logician, and hence
he had not denied anything held by the classical logician, but merely
changed the subject. (Dummett 1978a, 270)
The worry is that there is no proposition that the classical and nonclassical
logician disagree about. Despite the apparent disagreement about, say, whether
the law of excluded middle is valid, the parties are expressing their opinion about
different propositions. The classical logician attributes classical validity to a
proposition formed with their negation and disjunction, while the nonclassical
logician attributes nonclassical invalidity to a proposition formed with their
negation and disjunction. The result, Haack warns, is that ‘there is no real
conflict between [nonclassical] and classical logic’ (Haack 1974, 8).
2 Quine’s revisionism and gradualism
Both Haack and Dummett argue that Quine’s meaning-variance thesis is at
odds with the view about logic he championed in his influential ‘Two Dogmas of
Empiricism’ (Quine 1951). Here Quine claims that no theoretical statement is
immune to revision, not even the laws of logic. This is Quine’s revisionism:
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.
Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been
proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what
difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift
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whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin
Aristotle? (Quine 1951, 40)
Quine’s question is meant to suggest that there is only a difference in degree
between an allegedly a priori theory such as logic and the theories of the natural
sciences. This is Quine’s gradualism:
The kinship I speak for is rather a kinship with the most general
and systematic aspects of natural science, farthest from observation.
Mathematics and logic are supported by observation only in the
indirect way that those aspects of natural science are supported by
observation; namely, as participating in an organized whole which,
way up at its empirical edges, squares with observation. I am con-
cerned to urge the empirical character of logic and mathematics
no more than the unempirical character of theoretical physics; it is
rather their kinship that I am urging, and a doctrine of gradualism.
(Quine 1986, 100)
This kinship between logic and the empirical sciences have been echoed by a
number of more recent authors, for example Maddy (2002; 2014), Priest (2006;
2014; 2016), Russell (2014; 2015; (year?)), Williamson (2017), and Hjortland
(2017a; 2017b). Although they differ on the details, all these authors reject
the privileged epistemological status of logic, be it foundationalism, apriorism,
obviousness or self-evidence. Instead they subscribe to a view where logical
theories are supported by arguments similar to those used for theories in other
sciences. That doesn’t mean that logic is directly empirical in the sense that its
laws are justified by induction, but it does mean that logical theories answer to
a posteriori evidence through their connections with empirical theories.
According to revisionism, there can be genuine disagreement about logical
theories, and furthermore, there can be arguments that support rational theory-
choice. So if Quine favours a form of anti-exceptionalism, how can that be
squared with his meaning-variance thesis? Dummett’s answer is that Quine has
simply abandoned his position from ‘Two Dogmas’ in his later writings (e.g.
Quine 1960b; 1986). ‘In the meantime,’ Dummett writes, ‘Quine himself has
totally reversed his position, as may be seen from the chapter on ‘Variant Logics’
in Philosophy of Logic’ (Dummett 1978b, 270). Haack also concludes that Quine
has abandoned his earlier position:
The attack in ‘Two Dogmas’ on synonymy etc. would threaten an
account of logical truths as analytic because true in virtue of the
meaning of the logical constants. Now in Word and Object Quine
renews his sceptical attack on meaning notions, but makes an excep-
tion in the case of the logical connectives, which, he claims, do have
determinate meaning ...; and this paves the way for his acceptance ...
of a meaning-variance argument to the effect that the theorems of
deviant and classical logics are, alike, true in virtue of the meaning
of the (deviant or classical) connectives. (Haack 1978, 237)
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If Haack and Dummett’s interpretation is correct, Quine simply abandoned a
key component of his revisionism when he gave his meaning-variance thesis.2 If
Dummett is right, and it is ‘impossible for anyone to deny a law of classical logic’
(Dummett 1978b, 270, my emphasis), then how can one simultaneously insist
that logic is not only revisable, but rationally revisable?
Hence, revisionists have a reason to reject the meaning-variance argument.
Indeed, many commentators have found fault with Quine’s argument for the
thesis, regardless of whether or not they agree on Quine’s particular gradualist
picture.3 In the next section, we will look at some prominent objections to the
meaning-variance thesis.
3 Against meaning-variance
Recall Astrid and Beatrice, the two logicians who are in a dispute about a
logical law. Suppose that their dispute is about modus ponens (in the form
A,A Ñ B ( B). Astrid claims that it is valid, Beatrice disputes it. Suppose
further that modus ponens is a meaning-determining principle for Astrid’s
conditional. Since modus ponens is meaning-determining, it is valid simply
in virtue of the meaning of Astrid’s conditional. The worry is that Beatrice,
in disputing modus ponens, doesn’t succeed in rejecting the law that Astrid
supports. For that law is expressed with Astrid’s conditional, and if Beatrice
disputes it, she is simply rejecting some other law, expressed with her own
Beatrice-conditional (for which modus ponens doesn’t hold). There is, therefore,
no single proposition—the logical law—that Astrid accepts and Beatrice rejects.
If it is indeed true that Beatrice does not succeed in disputing the law
that Beatrice accepts, and, moreover, genuine disagreement is propositional
disagreement, then there is no genuine disagreement between Astrid and Beatrice.
The same line of reasoning will carry over to disputes about any logical law that
is meaning-determining. This is what leads Haack (1974, 8) to conclude that
there is ‘no real conflict’ between the parties of the dispute. She outlines the
argument as follows:
(a) if there is change of meaning of the logical constants, there is
no real conflict between Deviant and classical logic,
(b) if there is Deviance, there is change of meaning of the logical
constants,
so
(c) there is no real conflict between Deviant and classical logic.
(ibid.)
2Other authors have also attributed two mutually exclusive positions to Quine. Williamson (2007,
97) says that ‘Quine’s epistemological holism in “Two Dogmas” undermines his notorious later claim
about the deviant logician’s predicament’. Arnold & Shapiro (2007) investigate the conflict between
what they call the ‘logic-friendly Quine’ and the ‘radical Quine’.
3Of course, Dummett himself is a revisionist about logic. More about that below.
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However, it is unclear what Haack means by ‘no real conflict’. So in what follows,
we will work with a reformulation of the argument better suited to our purposes:
P1 If two parties, A and B, are in a dispute over a basic logical law S involving
logical expressions ˝1, ..., ˝n, then their dispute arises wholly in virtue of
A and B’s disagreement about the meaning of ˝1, ..., ˝n.
P2 If A and B are in a dispute over S, and the dispute arises wholly in virtue
of their disagreement about the meaning of an expression ˝ in S, then their
dispute is verbal.
C If two parties, A and B, are in a dispute over a basic logical law S involving
logical expressions ˝1, ..., ˝n, then their dispute is verbal.
The first premise (P1) corresponds very roughly to Haack’s premise (b), but the
formulation is different in a couple of ways. First, P1 talks only about disputes
over basic logical laws. The point is that two logicians could be in a dispute
about whether or not something is a logical law (a theorem), agree on all axioms
and primitive proof rules, but nonetheless reach different conclusions because
one of them made an error. In such cases, one would hope that the error could
be spotted, leading to genuine agreement. Those are clearly not the sort of cases
Quine’s meaning-variance thesis is supposed to apply to. Thus, P1 limits the
disputes to those about a subclass of logical laws.
Furthermore, note that basic logical laws can refer to logical truths (e.g. the
law of non-contradiction (  pϕ ^  ϕq) and to valid arguments (e.g. modus
ponens in the form ϕ,ϕ Ñ ψ ( ψ), but also to valid meta-arguments, that
is, arguments from a set of arguments to an argument (e.g. conditional proof,
classical reductio).4 This is important because many of the actual disputes
between classical and nonclassical logics are about meta-arguments. In fact,
certain logics agree on the validity of all arguments, but disagree about meta-
arguments.
Second, in Haack’s (b) we only learn that logical ‘deviance’ leads to ‘change
in meaning’. This is misleading. As Priest (2006) points out, even if we accept
the difference in meaning, it doesn’t follow that the classical logician keeps the
meaning fixed, whereas the nonclassical (i.e. deviant) logician ‘changes’ the
meaning. The classical logician certainly is not entitled to claim that their logical
concepts are the standard logical concepts, for example in the sense that natural
language expressions pick out the classical concepts. That is precisely one of the
claims that has been disputed by nonclassical logicians. Rather, the two parties
of the dispute enter the dispute with different meanings attached to the same
logical expression.










Third, P1 says that the difference in meaning is due to the expressions
involved in the logical law. For example, if the law of excluded middle (ϕ_ ϕ)
is basic, a dispute could arise in virtue of a disagreement about _ or  . However,
the dispute could also arise from a disagreement about the meaning of meta-
theoretic expressions. The law that the dispute is about is better expressed
as:
(1) xϕ_ ϕy is valid.
In that case, the two parties to the dispute could be assigning the same meaning
to _ and  , but different meanings to the logical expression ‘valid’.5 After
all, classical and nonclassical logics mean different things by these expressions,
just like they do with the run of the mill connectives. They might agree on
theory-relative terms, such as ‘classically valid’ or ‘intuitionistically provable’, but
they do not seem to agree on the meaning of ‘valid’ and ‘provable’ simpliciter.6
The result is that Quine’s meaning-variance thesis arguably applies not only to
logical connectives and quantifiers, but also to meta-theoretic logical expressions
(e.g. ‘valid’, ‘consistent’, ‘provable’). It is convenient, therefore, to talk more
broadly about logical laws as including such meta-theoretical claims, even if that
is unorthodox terminology.
Just as P1 corresponds to Haack’s premise (b), P2 roughly corresponds to
Haack’s (a). However, P2 avoids saying that there is ‘no real conflict’ between
classical and nonclassical logics, and instead claims that disputes about basic
logical laws are verbal disputes. In fact, P2 is a slightly modified version of an
account of verbal disputes due to Chalmers (2011). The account does not say
anything about logical disputes in particular, but gives a sufficient condition
for a dispute in general to be verbal. For the purposes of the meaning-variance
thesis, we will simply assume that Chalmers’ account is correct. What counts as
a verbal dispute is certainly an interesting discussion, but it is beyond the scope
of this paper.
For our purposes it is therefore the first premise that will receive most of the
attention. If P1 turns out to be false, then at least this type of argument for the
meaning-variance thesis is blocked. This is indeed the strategy that a number of
authors have used in their objection to Quine’s claim. What is required, then, is
a counterexample to the the conditional of P1: a case where two parties A and
B are in dispute over a basic logical law S, but where their dispute doesn’t arise
wholly in virtue of A and B’s disagreement about the meaning of the logical
expressions involved.
Suppose that modus ponens is a basic logical laws for the conditional, and
that A and B are in dispute over modus ponens. First, note that if B rejects
modus ponens, it is compatible with P1 that B believes that the dispute does
not arise wholly in virtue of a disagreement about meaning. She might insist
5A simple example is a pair of many-valued systems with the same truth-functions attached to
the logical connectives, but where validity is defined in terms of different preservation properties.
See Hjortland (2012) for a more detailed example.
6See Field (2015) for a discussion about this distinction.
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that the meaning she assigns to the conditional is the same as A, despite the
fact that she rejects modus ponens. All that P1 requires is that the dispute is, in
fact, a result of a disagreement about meaning, even if B fails to realize it. She
might have been convinced, for example, by McGee’s (1985) counterexample to
modus ponens, but still insist that she shares the same meanings as A. Of course,
it could turn out that what McGee’s counterexample shows is that, contrary
to previous claims, modus ponens isn’t a basic logical law for the conditional;
indeed, that it isn’t a logical law at all! But that is besides the point here. An
objection to P1 would have to satisfy the antecedent, namely that S is a basic
logical law.
One way to achieve this is to divorce basic logical laws from meaning-
determining laws. The law in dispute is only said to be a basic law, so if modus
ponens is a basic logical law for the conditional (in the sense that it is primitive),
but without being meaning-determining, then rejecting it is compatible with full
agreement on meaning. In other words, P1 can be resisted.
An early proponent of this objection is Putnam (1976). In keeping with
Quine’s revisionism, Putnam suggests that quantum mechanics gives us reason
to revise classical logic in favour quantum logic.7 In the latter system, the law
of distributivity (i.e. pϕ ^ pψ _ χqq Ñ ppϕ ^ ψq _ pϕ ^ χqq) is rejected, and
so the question of whether we are changing the meaning of disjunction arises.
However, Putnam believes that the revision is compatible with sameness of
meaning. He observes that even if there is subtle change of the primitive proof
rules for disjunction, there is a substantial number of shared theorems between
classical and quantum logic. For Putnam, the problem is that ‘we do not posses
a notion of ‘change in the meaning’ refined enough to handle this issue’ (ibid.,
190):
Only if it can be made out that [distributivity] is ‘part of the meaning’
of ‘or’ and/or ‘and’ (which? and how does one decide?) can it
be maintained that quantum mechanics involves a ‘change in the
meaning’ of one or both of these connectives. (ibid.)
In a similar vein, Field (2008, 17) also rejects the meaning-variance thesis
because of doubts about the very distinction between meaning-determining and
non-meaning-determining laws:
The question [of meaning change] is clear only to the extent that we
know how to divide up such firmly held principles into those that are
“meaning constitutive” or “analytic” and those which aren’t, and this
is notoriously difficult.
The worry is echoed by Shapiro (2014, 91):
My tentative conclusion ... is that the talk of whether the mean-
ing of the logical terminology is the same or different in different
7Putnam later changes his mind about quantum logic (cf. Putnam 1981; 2012).
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contexts/theories is itself context-sensitive and, moreover, interest-
relative—in part because such talk is vague. So I am skeptical of the
very question of whether the classicist and intuitionist, for example,
talk past each other—if we insist that this is a sharp and objective
matter, to be determined once and for all.
A related criticism of meaning-variance is that although there are meaning-
determining basic logical laws, not all basic laws are meaning-determining.
Elsewhere I have called this view minimalism about the meaning of logical
connectives (Hjortland 2012; 2014). Roughly put, the minimalist acknowledges
that a proper subset of the logical laws are meaning-determining, but allows for
non-verbal disputes about the remaining laws. The minimalist view has an early
formulation in the work of Putnam (1957) and Haack (1974), but has been given
a more precise formulation by Paoli (2003; 2007; 2014) and Restall (2002). Here
is Restall (2002, 11):
If any set of rules is sufficient to pick out a single meaning for
the connective, take that set of rules and accept those as meaning
determining. The other rules are important when it comes to giving
an account of a kind of logical consequence, but they are not used to
determine meaning.
Again, such a division of labour between logical laws will allow for disputes that
are non-verbal, though only if the disputes are about non-meaning-determining
laws. The difficulty is to identify a non-arbitrary divide between the basic laws
that contribute to the meaning and the ones that do not.
Paoli has developed an answer to this question by applying a useful distinction
from structural proof theory. In sequent calculus rules there are two types of
proof rules: operational rules, that is, left and right proof rules that govern
specific logical expressions, and structural rules, that is, proof rules that govern
the deducibility relation independent of the type of formula in question (e.g.
weakening, contraction).8 Paoli’s proposal is that whereas operational rules are
meaning-determining, structural rules are not. With the distinction in place,
the meaning theory allows for non-verbal disputes between logical theories that
differ only with respect to structural properties. That includes linear logics,
affine logics, and a number of relevant logics.
An immediate worry is that some standard disputes, such as that between
classical and intuitionistic logic, won’t count as genuine disagreements on this
account. But, since classical and intuitionistic logic can be formalized in sequent
calculus in such a way that the only difference is the cardinality of the succedent, it
has been suggested that even this dispute would count as a genuine disagreement
under the proposal.9 However, such a fix raises a more general concern. If we
anchor the meaning-determining versus non-meaning-determining distinction to
the operational versus structural distinction, we need the latter distinction to
8See Negri & von Plato (2001) for an introduction.
9The point is anticipated by Haack (1974).
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be sufficiently stable. The problem is that what counts as structural is highly
system-dependent. Different sequent calculi introduce structural operators in
the proof theory in order to add structural rules. In standard sequent calculus
we have right- and left-side commas, while generalizations like hypersequents
or labelled sequent calculus allow for new structural rules. Bunch theory with
intensional and extensional premise-combinators and bilateral systems further
load the structural language with operators. Such systems simply shift the
various logical properties of connectives over to the structural language.
In addition, even if the structural rules can be claimed to be independent
of the meaning of the specific connectives, there is still the question of whether
or not a change in structural rules brings about a shift in the meaning in
metatheoretic expressions such as ‘valid’ or ‘provable’. If that is the case, and
the disputes are about the validity of, say, the law of excluded middle, we are no
closer to an account of nonverbal disputes.10
Let us return to the argument for the meaning-variance thesis. Are there
other strategies for resisting the premise P1? Another influential criticism of the
idea that there are meaning-constitutive principles is due to Williamson (2007).
He formulates a number of objections against so-called understanding-assent
links (UA links). He denies that there are logical laws that a speaker must assent
to in order to qualify as understanding a connective. More generally, let S be a
sentence that expresses such a principle. Then consider the following UA link:
(2) Necessarily, everyone who understands the sentence S assents to it.
Contraposed, everyone who dissents to S fails to understand it. Williamson
objects to (2) and a number of related UA links. To see one reason why consider
the following example. Suppose that modus ponens is the principle in question.
Recall that McGee (1985) thinks there are counterexamples to modus ponens,
and therefore rejects the validity of the law. By the UA link this entails that
McGee does not understand the English language expression “if”. Williamson
thinks this conclusion is simply false:
In conversation, [McGee] appears to understand it perfectly well. By
ordinary standards, he does understand it. Before he had theoretical
doubts about modus ponens, he understood it. Surely his theoretical
doubts did not make him cease to remember what it means. Moreover,
his doubts derive from taking at face value a natural pattern of native
speaker reactions to an ingeniously chosen case. If he counts as not
understanding “if,” so do millions of other native speakers of English.
(ibid., 94)
If it turns out that the premise P1 entails the UA link, Williamson’s argument
would offer a strategy for blocking the argument for the meaning-variance thesis.
If we have reason to reject the UA link, we would also have reason to reject P1.
10See Hjortland (2014) for a more detailed criticism of minimalism, and Paoli (2014) for some
promising replies on behalf of the minimalist.
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However, in the current formulation P1 does not entail the UA link. In fact,
while it does require that one party dissents to a logical principle, it does not
require that the party therefore fails to understand any of the involved logical
expressions. It simply says that the dispute arises wholly in virtue of their
disagreement about the meaning of the expressions.
Of course, one could object that what Quine really had in mind was something
stronger than P1, and indeed a premise that entails the UA link. That is not
entirely uncalled for given Quine’s verdict that ‘neither party knows what he
is talking about’ in disputes about logical principles. At other points, however,
Quine makes comments that point to the more modest formulation. It is a
formulation, I argue, that allows us accept the meaning-variance thesis without
jettisoning genuine disagreement and the revisionism he endorses in his earlier
work.
4 Revisionism and meaning-variance reconciled
Not everyone has concluded that there is a dissonance between Quine’s revi-
sionism and the meaning-variance thesis. Although Priest (2006) disagrees with
Quine’s classicism, he suggests that there is more of a continuity between Quine’s
views than he is given credit for:
It would be wrong, however, to suppose that Quine takes the meaning
variance of connectives across different logics to be an argument
against his earlier view concerning the revisability of logic. (Priest
2006, 168)
Priest points out that rather than rejecting his old position, Quine (1986) seems
to open for the possibility that meaning-variance is not at odds with rational
revision of logical laws. Only a few pages after his infamous ‘change of logic,
change of subject’ quip, Quine is again discussing revision of a classical law, but
now in a more concessive manner:
[W]hoever denies the law of excluded middle changes the subject.
This is not to say that he is wrong in so doing. In repudiating ‘p or
„p’ he is indeed giving up classical negation, or perhaps alternation,
or both; and he may have his reasons. (Quine 1986, 83, my emphasis)
The contrast with the more polemical comments from earlier in the same chapter
is striking. Rather than accusing the parties of speaking past each other, he now
suggests that rejecting classical laws could have a rationale, even if it involves
giving up classical logical concepts.
But if revisionism is possible despite meaning-variance, what is the nature
of the revision and what is the nature of the underlying disagreement? One
possibility is that the disagreement is simply about meaning. By raising the
disagreement to a metalinguistic level, we can own the meaning-variance thesis
and still save genuine disagreement. Granted, in that case the impression that
the disagreement was about the law of excluded middle is misleading.
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That logical disputes are sometimes about meaning should be no surprise.
Some standard cases of disputes in the philosophy of logic are overtly about
meaning. Some discussions about logical laws are about how natural language
expressions, for instance ‘not’, ‘if’, ‘all’, are actually used. Semantic projects in
the spirit of Montague (1973) and Davidson (1967) are typically attempts at
using formal systems as tools in natural language semantics.11 Similarly, critics
of classical logic have pointed out that the logical laws governing, say, material
implication or the boolean negation simply do not accurately reflect how we use
their natural language counterparts. When relevantists refer to the postive and
negative paradoxes, and when McGee gives a natural language counterexample
to modus ponens, they are relying on natural language data. So, if the project
is to give a formal semantics for certain natural language expressions (i.e. the
logical expressions), the dispute is clearly about the meaning of these expressions.
But although formal logics are routinely used for this purpose, not all logical
disputes are about the semantics of natural language. After all, classical and
many nonclassical logics are not really concerned with the complexities of natural
language usage. Instead, some logicians are more concerned with the logic of the
concepts we ought to use than the logic of the concepts we actually use. The
approach varies from those who merely suggest that scientific purposes call for a
light modification of natural language (e.g. Quine’s regimentation) to those who
insist that a formal language should at least partly replace natural language in
order to achieve sufficient precision (e.g. Frege’s Begriffschrift). Shapiro (2006,
48) calls this the normative orientation towards logic.
A well-known example of the normative orientation is the type of intuitionist
revisionism promoted by Dummett (1991). According to Dummett, the classical
negation concept semantically misfires, and should therefore be replaced by
intuitionistic negation. The argument is explicitly about meaning. In fact,
Dummett’s contention is precisely that a revisionist argument for logic must
proceed via meaning-theoretic considerations. He identifies conditions that the
inference rules for logical expressions must satisify in order to count as meaningful
(e.g. conservativeness, harmony), and argues that classical negation fails the test.
Both the conditions that Dummett introduce and the claim that they aren’t
satisfied by classical concepts have been contended in the literature, but the
details are not important here.12 The point is that Dummett’s revisionism is
not only compatible with the meaning-variance thesis, but premised on the very
idea that revision of logic springs out of a disagreement about which concepts
are legitimate. The disagreement is metalinguistic, but definitely not ‘merely
verbal’. Compare it, for example, with Quine’s case of merely verbal dispute
where someone has simply swapped the terms ‘_’ and ^’ in the logical laws.
The latter dispute results from a notational variant, while Dummett’s revisions
are motivated by meaning-theoretic arguments. Even if we ultimately reject his
arguments for intuitionism, the revisionary strategy cannot be written off as a
linguistic confusion.
11Arguably the logic-as-modelling approach in Cook (2002) and Shapiro (1998; 2006) is a variant
of the semantic approach, but one on which the logical systems allow for more idealization.
12See for example Read (2000).
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5 Revision of concepts
Dummett’s revisionism is actually an example of a philosophical methodology
that has received more attention recently. Instead of merely offering conceptual
analysis of crucial concepts such as personal identity, justice, truth, and knowl-
edge, some philosophers engage in conceptual engineering.13 They do not merely
seek to elucidate the concepts we actually possess, but to investigate which
concepts we ought to use for certain purposes. When concepts do their job well,
they help us represent the world and express our thoughts. But concepts can also
be unhelpful. They can be too imprecise or nonexpressive. By some accounts
they can also be inconsistent or unethical. Since concepts can be deficient in
a variety of ways, the argument goes, we are sometimes better off with new
concepts. Ultimately, those who promote conceptual engineering think that we
sometimes ought to introduce replacement concepts.
Here are some examples. The folk concept mass is muddled. It runs together
two theoretical concepts, weight (measured in newtons) and mass (measured
in kilograms). The folk concept fish is unsuited for the theoretical purposes of
biology, where it has been replaced by the typological concept pisces and then by
concepts suited for phylogenetic classification. When greater precision is called
for, the everyday concepts of likelihood and chance are dispensed with in favour
of the mathematically precise concept of probability.
These are cases where deficient concepts have supposedly been replaced by
more sophisticated, theoretical alternatives. In other cases conceptual engineering
doesn’t involve conceptual re-engineering of already existing concepts.14 Instead
concepts that bear little similarity with already applied concepts are introduced
to fulfil some purpose. Concepts such as quark in physics or DNA in biology do
not serve as improvements of deficient concepts, but allow for the formulation of
improved theories.
What about concepts in logical theories? When Dummett (1973, 454) talks
about deficient concepts, he mentions the expression ‘Boche’, a slur used by the
French against Germans. The example is supposed to anticipate his analysis of
allegedly deficient logical concept, first the trivializing connective ‘tonk’ (Prior
1960), and ultimately the problems with classical negation. For Dummett,
‘rejection or revision of concepts’ is called for when the the inference rules
associated with the concept fail to ‘harmonize’. Although his diagnosis of the
defects of logical concepts is idiosyncratic, it is natural to think of this and
related projects in the philosophy of logic as cases of conceptual engineering.15
Later philosophers of logic have been even more explicitly engaged in what
they consider conceptual engineering. The most widely discussed case is likely
13See Scharp (2013), Burgess & Plunkett (2013), Cappelen (2018), and Eklund (2017a) for some
recent approaches to conceptual engineering as a methodology. Tanswell (2018) has also explored
how conceptual engineering can be applied in set theory. The label ‘conceptual engineering’ is due
to Blackburn (1999).
14According to Brun (2016), conceptual re-engineering is closely related to Carnap’s notion of
explication. (See also Dutilh Novaes & Reck 2017.)
15Tennant (1987; 1997) and Brandom (1994) are two philosophers who have followed Dummett in
relevant respects.
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the concept of truth. A number of authors have defended inconsistency theories,
according to which the everyday concept of truth is inconsistent (e.g. Azzouni
2007, Burgess & Burgess 2011, Eklund 2002; 2007, Scharp 2007; 2013, Patterson
2007; 2009, Scharp & Shapiro 2017). Although the authors disagree about
whether or not the alleged inconsistency is a reason to replace the everyday con-
cept of truth, at least some inconsistency theorists have developed and defended
replacement concepts. These concepts are designed to preserve consistency in
classical logic, while simultaneously staying faithful to a number of the expressive
roles traditionally assigned to the truth predicate.16
In order to be able to count concepts, and not only theories as inconsistent,
inconsistency theories agree that concepts are governed by constitutive principles.
A familiar example from logic is that standard proof rules are constitutive princi-
ples of logical concepts: conditional proof and modus ponens are constitutive of
the conditional; disjunction introduction and proof by cases are constitutive of
disjunction, etc. According to the inconsistency theorists, what sets the everyday
concept of truth apart is that its constitutive principles are inconsistent. Hence,
analogously with Dummett’s complaints about tonk and classical negation, in-
consistency theories identify problems in the very concept of truth. The core
idea is that the concept is governed by the naive T -schema or some unrestricted
inference rules, such as T -in and T -out.17 From that assumption, they argue
that since the semantic paradoxes lead to contradiction, the involved concept of
truth is inconsistent.
Of course, other accounts of the paradoxes can also explain the contradictions,
by attributing the problem to a bad theory of truth as opposed to a bad concept
of truth. It can still be acknowledged that the unrestricted truth principles must
be rejected, but it is denied that they have a privileged connection to the very
concept of truth. Eklund (2017b) also points out that the semantic paradoxes
do not unequivocally point to principles of truth as the culprit, even if these are
indeed constitutive. After all, some logical principles, for example of negation or
implication, are also involved. Indeed, the naive truth principles on their own
do not lead to inconsistency. Classical logic or some suitably strong nonclassical
logic is also required, together with a theory of syntax (e.g. arithmetic). So, even
if we accept that the unrestricted inference rules are constitutive, the paradoxes
need not be a reason for revising the concept of truth. It might equally well
suggest a revision of logical concepts.
That brings us to the more general point. Inconsistency theories are just
a special case of theories that promote conceptual engineering in logic broadly
speaking. The methodology can be extended in two ways, both of which are
arguably already implicit in Dummett’s work. First, inconsistency need not
be the only relevant conceptual flaw that motivates a revision. For Dummett,
16The most detailed suggestion for a concrete replacement can be found in Scharp (2013).
17The T -schema is the biconditional T pxϕyq Ø ϕ, where xϕy is the name of the sentence ϕ. The






inconsistency is only a limit case. Less damaging features of the constitutive
principles (e.g. nonconservativeness) might also suggest that a logical concept is
flawed. Second, conceptual engineering could be applied to logical concepts that
are more central to logical theorizing than truth.
Consider for example the material implication in classical logic. Although it
resembles the English language indicative conditional in a number of respects, it
is certainly a minority view that the material implication is an accurate semantic
theory of its natural language counterpart. We routinely pause in introductory
logic classes to warn our students about straightforwardly translating from
natural language ‘if’ to the the material implication in the formal language. The
reason, of course, is that the material implication is at best an idealization of any
natural language concept. We trade in the nuances of the indicative conditional
for a number of theoretical advantages. It has a simple semantics and it is
interdefinable with other connectives. But most of all the material implication
contributes to a highly successful formal theory of mathematical proofs.
In fact, the conceptual engineering methodology need not be limited to
connectives and quantifiers. Even the concept of validity, arguably the most
central logical concept, can be the target of engineering. In fact, just like
inconsistency theorists have been inspired by Tarski’s criticism of truth in
natural language, we could take Tarski’s dismissive remarks about the ordinary
concept of consequence as an invitation to think of his model-theoretic definition
as a conceptual re-engineering:
With respect to the clarity of its content the common concept of
consequence is in no way superior to other concepts of everyday lan-
guage. Its extension is not sharply bounded and its usage fluctuates.
Any attempt to bring into harmony all possible vague, sometimes
contradictory, tendencies which are connected with the use of this
concept, is certainly doomed to failure. (Tarski, 1936, p. 409)
Tarski is not trying to account for any concept of consequence that we actually
employ in natural languages. Instead he is defining a theoretical concept with
the advantage of the precision offered by the model-theoretic framework. Its
success is not only due to the fact that Tarski captures important intuitions
about logical consequence, but also its utility for mathematical and philosophical
purposes.
Eklund (2017c), who supports conceptual engineering in other cases, has
suggested it has application in logic as well. According to him, we can best make
sense of the philosophical interest in logical pluralism vs monism if we consider
the issue as one about which language we ought to have for certain theoretical
purposes:
Doubts about the significance of the actual language project point us
toward the normative project. The normative project – what is the
best type of language like? what is the best truth predicate like? the
best negation? – promises to have the significance that the actual
language project lacks. (Eklund 2017c, 5)
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What is the upshot of the conceptual engineering approach for the question
of disagreement? Given conceptual engineering we can trade in the first-order
dispute about logical laws for a metalinguistic (or meta-conceptual) disagreement
about whether to adopt, say, intuitionistic negation instead of classical negation.
The latter dispute is genuine disagreement, even if it counts as verbal dispute in
the sense that it arises wholly in virtue of the parties’ dispute about meanings. It
is just that the disagreement is not about the actual meaning of a natural language
expression, but about which concept we ought to use in our theorizing. On this
picture, Astrid and Beatrice’s dispute about the law of excluded middle cannot
be dismissed as insubstantial, but it nonetheless allows for meaning-variance.
6 Theory-choice and concept-choice
The conceptual engineering methodology offers a way to accept the meaning-
variance thesis without giving up on genuine disagreement about logic. Yet,
we set out to do more than simply find an approach to logical theorizing that
would vindicate meaning-variance. We also want an approach that combines the
meaning-variance thesis with Quine’s revisionism and gradualism. Suppose that
Dummett’s intuitionism is indeed a case of conceptual engineering. Although
Dummett and the Quine of ‘Two Dogmas’ share the view that logic can be
revised, their methodologies remain far apart. Dummett’s brand of revisionism
is a revision of concepts, justified by meaning-theoretic arguments. The resulting
justification of basic logical laws is an a priori justification. Since Quine rejects
apriorism, his revisionism, in contrast, is designed precisely to explain how logical
theories can be justified on a nonapriori basis.
The worry, then, is that conceptual engineering is in conflict with Quinean
revisionism about logic. However, even if Dummett’s revisionism cannot be
reconciled with nonapriorism, it does not mean that revision of concepts has no
place in a Quinean epistemology of logic. For as we have seen above (in section
4), Quine thinks that you can have perfectly good reasons for rejecting a logical
concept (e.g. classical negation). Those reasons would not be a meaning-theoretic
argument like Dummett’s, but rather a matter of theory-choice. What is more,
Quine’s gradualism leads him to conclude that the mechanism of theory-choice
in logic ought to be similar to that of the sciences.
Even though Quine (1986) appears dismissive of nonclassical logic, the
very chapter where he accuses the deviant logician of ‘changing the subject’ is
followed by a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of concrete
nonclassical theories (ibid., 83–9). His emphasis is on how these theories and
classical logic compare wholesale with respect to a number of theoretical virtues
(e.g. simplicity, the maxim of minimal mutilation, unification with other theories,
expressive power, deductive strength). He readily admits that classical logic
has issues both with semantic paradoxes and vagueness, but maintains that the
cost of rejecting classical laws in favour of a nonclassical alternative is too high.
In Quine (1981) he goes further in listing the drawbacks of a classical theory
of vagueness, but concludes that its simplicity still outweighs the advantage a
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nonclassical logic affords. In sum, he favours an abductive argument for classical
logic.
For Quine, there is no conflict between abductive arguments for logic and the
meaning-variance thesis. In revising our theories we not only change the laws,
but we also introduce new concepts. These concepts should be better suited for
the theoretical task, and they are only warranted when they make valuable—or
even indispensable—contributions to the theory. Put differently, theory-choice
and concept-choice happen simultaneously. In line with his confirmational holism,
it is theories and not individual logical laws that receive evidential support. If
we reject one theory of logic for another, we not only reject laws of logic, but we
replace the theoretical concepts of one logic with another. That is compatible
with there being no identifiable set of laws that together form the constitutive
principles for a concept in the theory, and thus no identifiable truths of the
theory that count as conceptual truths.
Moreover, this revision of concepts is not a feature unique to logical theories.
Theory-choice and concept-choice are indistinguishable in general, be it in physics,
economics, or logic. Let us return to conceptual engineering for a moment. Recall
that many of the examples of allegedly successful applications of the methodology
come from outside philosophy (cf. Brun 2016). Eklund (2014, 293) also underlines
that there is nothing exceptional about philosophy in this respect:
[W]hile philosophers often have been concerned with our actual con-
cepts or the properties or relations they stand for, philosophers should
also be asking themselves whether these really are the best tools
for understanding the relevant aspects of reality, and in many cases
consider what preferable replacements might be. Philosophers should
be engaged in conceptual engineering. Compare: when physicists
study reality they do not hold on to the concepts of folk physics but
use concepts better suited to their theoretical purposes. Why should
things stand differently with what philosophers study?
Revision of concepts is not a specifically logical or philosophical methodology; it
is ubiquitous throughout the sciences. Hence, if meaning-variance is a worry for
genuine disagreement in logic, it ought to be one in physics as well. In fact, in
her discussion of Quine’s meaning-variance thesis in logic, Haack points out that
a corresponding meaning-variance thesis has been promoted in the philosophy
of science (Feyerabend 1962). Yet, most philosophers would not conclude from
this that there is no genuine disagreement between rival theories in chemistry
and economics. If the meaning-variance prevents genuine disagreement in logic,
that would have to be because the rival parties cannot have rational dispute
about concept-choice, for example because of incommensurability. However, the
meaning-variance thesis in itself does not provide a reason for such a dramatic
conclusion. It also seems unlikely that Quine accepted this conclusion, given
his explicit assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of classical and
nonclassical logics respectively. But, most importantly, the conclusion is belied
by what happens in actual debates about logical theories. The classicist and the
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nonclassicist do not fail to understand each other’s concepts. Williamson and
Field understand paracomplete and classical concepts perfectly well, but assess
the theories they are embedded in differently.
Conclusion
Quine’s meaning-variance thesis should not be considered a threat against genuine
logical disagreement. The thesis is compatible with revisionism, in fact a form
of metalinguistic revisionism already part of many disputes about logic. There
is no real conflict between Quine’s revisionism and his meaning-variance thesis.
Concept-choice is an integrated part of theory-choice, in logic and elsewhere in
the sciences.
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